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Abstract
Is the regularity of elections a requisite for political stability? Scholars have empirically
examined a number of features regarding elections in new democracies, including
frequency, alternation, and orderliness, but little work has considered the potential
impacts of consistency in the intervals in which they occur. Notwithstanding,
predominant conceptualizations of democracy require that governments hold elections
at regular intervals. This study examines the extent to which the regularity of the
intervals in which elections occur a↵ects political stability. Using newly released data
from the Varieties of Democracy project, we estimate a model predicting internal armed
conflict based on the pattern of previous elections. We argue that consistent election
intervals send a valuable signal of actors’ commitment to regularly hold elections, in part
by providing a focal point for coordinated actions in the future. By better specifying
the multiple ways in which elections are time-dependent, the analysis contributes to a
more robust consideration of the means by which elections promote power-sharing under
tenuous circumstances.
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1. Introduction
Is the regularity of elections a requisite for political stability? Definitions of democracy
either explicitly require or implicitly assume that elections are held at regular intervals.
Yet, in reality this is not often the case. From 1900 to 2012 only four of the 166 countries
with records of repeated legislative elections have held them at regular intervals. Many
of these electoral regimes have proven unstable—some experiencing military coups and
even civil war—while others have turned into institutionalized democracies. Yet, no study
has examined the systematic impact of ‘o↵-cycle’ elections on the prospects for domestic
stability and political longevity. This study addresses that gap by seeking to answer the
important question of whether elections must be held at regular intervals in order for
political stability to persist.
We hypothesize that the consistency of elections—their occurrence at regular
intervals—matters for perpetuation of stability. In short, the theory is that if elections
represent “institutionalized uncertainty,” the consistency with which elections occur
should a↵ect actors’ perception of certainty that elections will continue to occur. More
irregularity in terms of the intervals between elections should make actors’ less certain
that another election will in fact be held at all. Electoral consistency should therefore
increase actors’ incentives for accepting a current electoral loss, in anticipation of the next
election. Where elections frequently deviate from normal intervals, actors should feel less
certain and therefore be more willing to challenge the status quo through unconstitutional
means, such as armed conflict. We also hypothesize that this e↵ect should be stronger in
new democracies and at lower levels. In countries with a high level of democracy that has
persisted for a long time, actors’ trust that elections will reoccur should not be a↵ected
much by some variation in intervals between elections.
We test the argument with a model predicting the likelihood of internal armed conflict
and civil war for countries coded as electoral regimes in the Varieties of Democracy dataset
(Coppedge et al., 2015c) between 1900 and 2012. In support of the theory, the results
show that a lack of consistency of legislative elections’ intervals is associated with a higher
risk of internal armed conflict and civil war. This holds both when using a binary indicator
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of whether each subsequent election was held at the same interval as the last, as well as
when using a measure representing deviation from the average intervals between elections.
The relationship is robust to a number of alternative specifications and the inclusion of
controls. The analysis fails to find empirical support for the theoretical expectation that
the e↵ect diminishes at higher levels of democratic consolidation, however, as proxied
for by an interaction term between the measure of deviation and an index of electoral
democracy.
This study contributes to scholarship on elections in autocracies and new
democracies, and their e↵ects on conflict, by testing a key theoretical mechanism by
which they may contribute to political stability (Fearon, 2011). Primarily, the finding
that consistency in the intervals between legislative elections matters underscores the
expectation that credibility problems persist beyond first elections among opposition
actors. In the following sections, we discuss the role of elections in institutionalizing
uncertainty and present the hypotheses regarding election regularity and political
stability. We present an approach to measuring election consistency, and summarize
the results of empirical models predicting internal armed conflict and civil war. The
results encourage scholars to critically consider the di↵erent timing mechanisms involved
in elections and their potential impacts on political transitions.
2. Theory
While multiparty elections do not equate democracy—an inference that would constitute
a ‘fallacy of electoralism’ (Karl, 1986)—they are nonetheless necessary for it (Huntington,
1991 pg. 9; Linz and Stepan, 1996, pg.2). Critically, democracy is a system where losers
accept their lot under conditions of ”institutionalized uncertainty” (Przeworski, 1991, pg.
10). Yet, the trappings of democracy in the form of regularly held multiparty elections are
now common also among electoral authoritarian regimes (Schedler, 2006). An extensive
literature has emerged debating if repeated multiparty elections in these settings promote
authoritarian stability (e.g. Greene, 2007; Lust, 2009; Magaloni, 2008; Malesky and
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Schuler, 2011; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007), or rather further democratization (e.g.
Beissinger, 2007; Di Palma, 1990, Edgell and Lindberg, 2015; Howard and Roessler, 2006;
Lindberg, 2006, Lindberg, 2009; Miller, 2015; Schedler, 2009), and if holding elections“too
early”increases the risk of conflict (e.g. Brancati and Snyder, 2011; Flores and Nooruddin,
2012; Reilly, 2002). One important aspect of repeated elections that the current literature
is silent on, is the consequences of the potential uncertainty created by incumbents finding
ways to alter when elections are held. While the literature has analyzed many aspects
of the ”menu of manipulation” (Schedler, 2002) the e↵ect of varying intervals between
elections on regime instability has not be scrutinized before to the best of our knowledge.
Yet, marshaling multiparty elections have increasingly been used as part and parcel of
political transitions involving redistributional and other conflicts. As noted by Joshi et al.
(2015), “[e]lections have become the primary mechanism since the Cold War for regulating
political contestation among conflict parties emerging from civil war through a negotiated
settlement” (pg. 2). At the heart of political transitions is uncertainty—politicians have
a hard time committing to democracy, making elections both tenuous and vital (Brancati
and Snyder, 2011, Flores and Nooruddin, 2012, Joshi et al., 2015). This is exemplified
by the observation of countries returning to war after elections under weak institutions
(Brancati and Snyder, 2011, Flores and Nooruddin, 2012). The credibility of elections
presents a multifaceted problem that may depend on a number of factors—whether
elections occur, how soon they occur, and if they occur on time (Bratton, 1998, Brancati
and Snyder, 2011, Cederman et al., 2012, Cheibub and Hays, 2015, Flores and Nooruddin,
2012).
At their onset, elections can help temper actors’ preferences for armed conflict.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that by sending a credible signal of elites’
willingness to commit to future redistribution, democratization can prevent armed revolt
in the short term. Nevertheless, the potential for violence does not end with ‘founding
elections’ (Schmitter, 1994). A series of “first election” failures in democratizing countries
after 1974 underscores the vulnerability that continues despite elections (Huntington,
1991, Lindberg, 2006, Schmitter, 1994). To the extent that elections mark the
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inauguration of a transition to democracy, they should only do so by beginning to place
boundaries on uncertainty associated with the transition. Among the actors considering
competing in future elections, it remains unclear whether each of the actors will abide
by the results of the election and whether there will be subsequent contests for o ce
(Bratton, 1998). Thus, while the initial turn to elections may prevent conflict by adding
credibility to elites’ promises, for representatives weighing armed conflict as an option,
credibility issues should remain that continue to threaten political stability for some time.
Several questions persist regarding credibility problems beyond initial elections. The
first and perhaps most important credibility problem that actors must contend with
after initial elections concerns adherence to the rules. Why would actors continue to
choose elections over violence when elections do not produce their desired outcomes?
This reputational concern can be mitigated by repeated elections, which signal a
“well-functioning” arrangement and serve as “confidence building measures” (Joshi et al.,
2015, pg. 2). Consistent elections should contribute to renewing commitments to regime
stability by guaranteeing that the interests of ruling elites and their opposition will be
given a continued space for articulation and contest (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006,
O’Donnell and Whitehead, 1986).
Subsequent to initial elections, the consistency of election intervals can provide a
source of stability by establishing common expectations regarding the next opportunity
to compete for o ce. Electoral ‘losers’ in the present round should be less likely to
extra-constitutionally challenge the results if there are ‘focal points’ for legitimately
winning in the next election. By lengthening elites’ time-horizons, regularly occurring
elections may be enough to convince dissatisfied participants that there will be another
opportunity to pursue their goals. An election schedule can also enhance credibility
by setting the dates for future elections. Creating and adhering to an electoral schedule
signals at least minimal willingness to observe constitutional constraints and to accept the
outcomes of the electoral process (Bratton, 1998, Joshi et al., 2015). Regularly occurring
elections can thus encourage elites to accept current losses and continue to participate.
Non-elites’ preferences for elections may be conditioned by their expectations
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regarding the prospects for collective action, which is in turn a↵ected by the regularity of
elections (Przeworski, 1991). Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that the temporary
threat of collective action by non-elites induces elites to o↵er elections as a way of
institutionalizing citizen power in order to prevent revolution. After forgoing action in
the present, however, it can become exceedingly di cult to organize in the future. Svolik
(2013) and Meirowitz and Tucker (2013) demonstrate that repeatedly poor performance
under “democratic” practices can undermine citizens’ willingness to organize. If choosing
to accept elections over revolution renders citizens vulnerable to exacerbated collective
action problems in the future, non-elites may only be willing to accept elections if there
are mechanisms that help to lower the threshold for action in the future. Regular election
intervals do this by providing clearly defined opportunities for organizing in the future.
By stipulating when future elections ought to occur, opposing actors can anticipate
opportunities in which coordination would be easier and may thus be more willing
to forego present action. As Fearon (2011) argued, “it is the commonly understood
convention of holding elections at particular times according to known rules, not the
electoral outcome itself, that provides a public signal for coordinating rebellion in the
event that elections are suspended or blatantly rigged”(pg. 1676). The timing mechanism
provided by regular election intervals for citizens to hold their government accountable
is considered a critical feature that makes democracy “self-enforcing” (Fearon, 2011,
Weingast, 1997). As a result, citizens’ preferences for elections over revolution may stem
in part from the expectation that there are regularized opportunities for future action.
There are some additional ways in which consistently occurring elections may
enhance political stability, especially where other critical aspects—such as the actors and
their agendas—are in flux. Regular intervals between elections may support the need to
aggregate information about, and to adjust, macroeconomic and political performance
in between elections. Several studies consider this by looking at the relationship
between election cycles and international war (Gaubatz, 1991) and economic fluctuations
surrounding the timing of elections (Blaydes, 2006, Remmer, 1993). The consistency
provided by a regular election schedule should also be expected to moderate negative
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e↵ects of highly volatile elections and political extremism (Epperly, 2011). Given a higher
degree of certainty associated with the expectation of a forthcoming election, an actor
may be more willing to moderate their behavior in order to win legitimately because they
foresee the possibility of a future electoral victory. Moreover, a regular electoral schedule
may matter for evening the playing field. O↵-cycle elections attract lower voter turnout,
which has the capacity to privilege some interest groups over others (Anzia, 2011; 2012).
In sum, in order to initially deter the threat of opposition violence, rulers may o↵er
elections to signal their commitment to allowing the articulation of interests and space
for contestation. Yet, while initial elections may add credibility to promises and prompt a
political transition, additional credibility mechanisms are probably necessary to keep the
momentum going. The consistency of regular intervals between elections provides greater
certainty about the institutionalized opportunities for future contestation and collective
action, helping to provide such credibility. Due to the role of elections in institutionalizing
uncertainty, especially in new or fragile democracies, we argue that they should be more
e↵ective in terms of providing political stability when they occur at regular intervals. The
first theoretical expectation can therefore be expressed in the following hypothesis:
H1: Consistent elections are associated with greater political stability.
‘Consistent’ may admittedly have two connotations. As the quality of not deviating
from individuals’ expectations, consistent elections can refer to elections that adhere to
formal requirements of terms. Elections may not need to occur at strict intervals, so long
as there are commonly held beliefs about their timing. In multiparty parliamentary
democracies such as Britain for example, legislative majorities can sometimes force
early elections, which is consistent with voters’ expectations (Lupia and Strøm, 1995).
More strictly speaking, electoral consistency means that they occur at equal intervals
in accordance with a known schedule. The theory above suggests that adherence to a
repetitive electoral schedule should provide a higher degree of certainty for actors and thus
lower the incentives for the use of alternative means such as violence. This e↵ect should
be mostly visible in young democracies and countries transitioning toward democracy,
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precisely because of a lack of assuring experience of when elections should re-occur.
The violence-reducing impacts of electoral regularity need not depend on a formal
schedule, however; the certainty with which actors continue to participate in elections
should be largely based on iterative practice. If asymmetric information disposes one
to resort to violence, then each subsequent election should lessen the preference for
conflict by providing incrementally more information about the likelihood that another
election would occur within the same time frame. This hearkens to classic games in which
individuals update their beliefs based on iterative play (Axelrod, 1984). In transitional
situations characterized by high uncertainty, therefore, actors may rely on the timing of
elections as an indicator of reliability. As a result, elections that are held at consistent
intervals should constitute an important source of reputational credibility. “When a
critical mass of citizens has reason to believe that other citizens and key elites expect
democratic rules to stay in place and electoral politics to prevail, such a belief is likely to
act as a self-fulfilling prophecy” (Lindberg, 2009, pg. 91).
Among countries transitioning to democracy, the consistent timing of repeated
elections should be particularly important due to its formative ability to institutionalize
a reassuring level of certainty about the likelihood of the next election. All the same, the
credibility of elections is also at stake in electoral authoritarian regimes, which regularly
hold scheduled elections and resort to subtle electoral fraud (Levitsky and Way, 2010,
Morse, 2012, Schedler, 2002). The di culties associated with regularizing participation
by political opponents and governing the masses should be greater where elections are
newer or the legitimacy of the regime is in question. As a result, the gray zone that has
been referred to as ‘illiberal democracy’ and ‘semi-democracy’ may be where consistent
elections matter most. The theoretical expectations of a socialization e↵ect, whereby
repeated elections lead to greater political stability, should have limited explanatory
power in more consolidated democracies. As a result, we expect that the stabilizing
e↵ect of regular election intervals is diminished in more democratic countries:
H2: Consistent elections are associated with greater political stability in less democratic
countries.
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3. Research Design
We expect regular election intervals to augment political stability, primarily so in
transitioning and new democracies, and in electoral authoritarian regimes. More
specifically, we expect that consistency in the timing of elections is negatively associated
with political instability—and, conversely, that greater irregularity in the intervals
between elections makes political instability more likely. The null hypothesis is that
the time between elections does not make a country more politically stable. At the
same time, we expect that this e↵ect is moderated by the extent to which the country
is democratic, such that changes in the election cycle should have a greater e↵ect in less
democratic countries.
To measure the intervals between elections, we rely on data provided by the Varieties
of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al., 2015b). The V-Dem data are the
culmination of a collaborative e↵ort of more than 50 scholars, employing over 2,500
country experts, to accurately document attributes of democracy for 173 countries from
1900 to the present.1 For each year, the data denote whether an executive election
occurred, as well as whether an election occurred for the legislative or constituent
assembly. Based on these binary indicators, we calculated the number of years that
transpired between each type of election.
Figure 1 depicts the variation in the timing of executive elections. In the figure,
vertical lines denote countries that had elections at more than one interval. Interestingly,
of the 115 countries that are have had executive-electoral regimes—holding regularly
scheduled direct elections for the executive—only 21 countries appeared to have no
variation in the time between executive elections. The most consistent is the United
States, which has held 29 executive elections at the same interval. However, executive
elections have been held at up to nine di↵erent intervals in the same country. The two
1The V-Dem dataset includes data on over 350 indicators of democracy in 173 countries around the world
from 1900 until 2012 (for 60 countries also 2013-2014), engaging over 2,600 country experts worldwide to
collect data. The country-expert data is combined into country-year estimates using a state–of–the–art
Bayesian ordinal item–response theory model developed by a set of specialized methodologists (Pemstein
et al., 2015; see also Coppedge et al., 2015a. For more information about the project, codebook and
data, see: https://v-dem.net.)
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Figure 1. Intervals between executive elections, by country
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most unstable are Bolivia and Ecuador. Figure 2 shows the extent to which countries
vary in the consistency of intervals between legislative elections. Among the 166 countries
with legislative-electoral regimes, only four had no variation in the timing of legislative
elections. Three of the four countries had only limited experience with legislative
elections—Eritrea (two), Kosovo (four), and Tajikistan (five). In contrast, the United
States held 57 legislative elections at regular intervals over this period.
Figures 1 and 2 underscore an important observation regarding the consistency
of elections. Many have not occurred at regular intervals across countries’ electoral
histories. It seems that this in itself is an important fact to highlight, as all prominent
definitions of democracy require as one of their criteria that elections occur at known and
regular intervals (Cheibub et al., 2010, Przeworski et al., 2000). While it is outside the
scope of this paper to investigate the formal schedule by which executive and legislative
elections were supposed to occur—if they were formalized at all—it is plausible to assume
that actors develop an expectation based on the (in-)consistency of observed elections.
To indicate political stability, we primarily rely on data on internal unrest and civil
war as dependent variables. First, we examine whether a country experienced an internal
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Figure 2. Intervals between legislative elections, by country
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armed conflict in a given year, which is coded as a binary variable (Clio-Infra, N.d.). To
discern the extent to which it is associated with escalated violence, we also restrict the
analysis to civil war in a separate specification. This is defined as an intra-state war that
incurs at least 1,000 battle deaths in each country-year (Haber and Menaldo, 2011).2
The variable is coded as 1 if an armed conflict occurred that reached the battle-death
threshold in a given year, and 0 otherwise. Because conflict may be an indirect measure
of underlying sources of political instability, we also estimated the impact of election
irregularity on strikes, riots, and anti-government protests (Banks, 2011), government
crisis (Banks, 2011), military coups (Powell and Thyne, 2011), and irregular leader exit
(Goemans et al., 2009).
To determine whether the consistency of elections matters for democratic stability,
we began by regressing the outcome on a binary indicator of whether the last election
occurred at the same interval as the one before it. The variable thus takes a value of
one if the two intervals of time occurring between the last three elections were the same,
and zero when that was not the case. For missing data or years before the third election,
2We accessed the data created by Clio-Infra (N.d.) and Haber and Menaldo (2011) from the V-Dem
dataset (Coppedge et al., 2015b).
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this variable takes on no value but is instead coded as missing. Figure 3 illustrates
the proportion of observations in which there was internal armed conflict, divided into
whether or not a change in the interval between elections had occurred the year prior,
and whether there was conflict in the previous year. As the figure shows, the number of
observations of internal armed conflict were nearly twice as much after a change in the
interval between legislative elections than when no change was observed. This is true for
observations in which there was not conflict in the year prior, as well as when there was
ongoing conflict. Executive elections do not appear to produce conflict when there are
changes in the intervals between them. Figure 8 in the Appendix shows a tabulation in
the other direction, confirming that changes in the intervals between elections were not
more likely to occur following conflict in the previous year, whether or not the intervals
had also changed in the year prior. The figures suggest that endogeneity does not pose
a major problem.
Figure 3. Tabulation of conflict observations associated with changes in
election intervals
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As a way of going beyond the last two intervals between elections, we calculated the
absolute di↵erence between the last election interval and the average period between past
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elections. The calculation of this measure can be given by
|⌃(xi,1...xi,t 1)
n  1   xi,t| (1)
where xi,t represents the number of years that have transpired between a current election
and the last election in a country. Each subsequent executive or legislative election
is compared using a greater amount of information than the previous election, as the
sequence of elections becomes progressively longer. The resulting value, however, is a
weighted measure of the consistency of elections over time; it imposes a higher penalty
on countries that have had a long period of consistent elections followed by a deviation,
and it moderately reflects previous digressions, even as elections stabilize.
We compared this approach to other algorithms that might represent electoral
consistency. The result is nearly identical to assuming, after each election, that the
country had always had elections at the previous interval and calculating the average
di↵erence in years between the observed intervals and the hypothetical, constant intervals.
The two measures are correlated at a value of 0.97. Using the di↵erence between the
last period between elections and the average interval between elections thus represents
the extent to which each country deviated from an individual’s expectation of consistent
elections. Because many elections were consistent with prior intervals, the distribution
of this measure is highly positively skewed. We therefore used log-transformed values as
the primary independent variables, the distributions of which are shown in Figure 4.3 In
the interpretation of the distance from average intervals, higher values indicate a greater
discrepancy between the last election and the previous average interval between elections.
3To apply a logarithmic transformation to the distance values and maintain observations with a zero, we
first added one to each observation. Nevertheless, the results remain robust to the inclusion of a control
for zero values.
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Figure 4. Logged distance from average intervals
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The left figure shows values associated with executive elections,
while the right figure shows the values for legislative elections.
Regressing conflict occurrence on deviations from the average interval between
elections presents a potential issue, which is that it may reflect increasing conflict
likelihood as a result of the executive (or congress) holding onto power for a longer
period of time. To account for this, we therefore include as a control variable the
number of years since the last election. In testing the potential impact of electoral
inconsistency on domestic instability, we examine executive elections and legislative
elections separately. Nearly 96 percent of country-year observations that constituted
executive electoral regimes were also considered legislative electoral regimes (4,594 and
4,397 respectively), but only about 57 percent of observations in legislative electoral
regimes were considered executive electoral regimes (10,248 and 4,397 respectively). As
a result, we consider the impacts of electoral consistency for each type of election and
combine them as a robustness test.
Figure 3 provides two examples that illustrate how the measure accounts for
changes in the intervals between elections. The left panel illustrates changes in the
timing of executive elections in Mexico. Following the widespread series of uprisings
against Porfirio Dı´az that constituted the Mexican Revolution, a new constitution
was promulgated in 1917 and executive elections were held (Benjamin, 1985). A´lvaro
Obrego´n won the presidential election in 1920 and Plutarco Calles succeeded him in 1924.
Obrego´n was subsequently reelected in 1928, but was assassinated shortly thereafter.
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Calles’ response was to establish a political party to depersonalize disagreements among
revolutionary elites, which took the form of the National Revolutionary Party (Partido
Nacional Revolucionario, PNR) (Benjamin, 1985). In 1934 La´zaro Ca´rdenas assumed
the presidency, after which the presidential term was fixed at six years (Kaufman and
Purcell, 1980, Weldon, 1997). Since 1940, presidential elections have been consistent
in Mexico, which is reflected in decreasing values of electoral discrepancy. Notably,
however, the consistent elections that occurred between 1940 and 2000 constitute a period
of nondemocratic rule (Magaloni, 2008).
The right panel shows values associated with legislative elections in the Philippines.
The first legislative election was held in 1907 under the first General Election Law of the
Philippines (Teehankee, 2002). The second legislative election occurred two years later
in 1909. Elections at this time were not consistent, however; the third legislative election
came after three years, and the fourth after four years. As a result, the measure of electoral
consistency increases. Subsequently, legislative elections in the Philippine Commonwealth
occurred every three years until 1934 (Teehankee, 2002). In 1935 a constitution was
established, which was followed by a new set of elections. A constitutional amendment
passed in 1947 that extended the term of Representatives to four years, which became
e↵ective in 1949. The measure of deviation thus increases with the next election in 1953
and gradually decreases until the 1971 mid-term senatorial election (Choi, 2001). The
following year, President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law, after which elections
did not occur until 1978. The next Batasang Pambansa election occurred in 1984. After
Marcos was ousted in 1986, a new constitution was promulgated. However, the election
in 1992 was the first election that was synchronized under the 1987 constitution (Choi,
2001, Teehankee, 2002).
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Figure 5. Examples, deviations from electoral consistency
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The left figure shows values associated with executive elections in Mexico,
while the right figure shows the values for legislative elections in the Philippines.
The second hypothesis is that the impact of electoral consistency on domestic
stability is moderated by the extent to which a country is a consolidated democracy.4
Although the countries in the sample all held elections, some more closely embodied the
ideal of electoral democracy.5 We therefore controlled for electoral democracy by including
an index based on freedom of association, su↵rage, clean elections, elected executives, and
freedom of expression (Coppedge et al. 2015).6 As a test for hypothesis 2, we included an
interaction term combining the electoral democracy index and the measure of deviation
from electoral consistency. Our expectation is that higher values of the interaction term
should be negatively associated with democratic instability.
In addition to the primary independent variables, we introduced several factors
representing other domestic features that should influence the likelihood of domestic
conflict. To control for economic development, we included logged values of per capita
Gross Domestic Product (Coppedge et al. 2015). A country can be economically wealthy
due to rents not tied to the populace, which can negatively a↵ect state capacity (Haber
and Menaldo, 2011, Ross, 2001, Wright, 2008). As a result, in alternative specification
tests we also accounted for the logged real value of a country’s petroleum, coal, and natural
4For a discussion of definitional issues related to the concept of democratic consolidation, see Schedler
(1998).
5The ideal of electoral democracy, according to Coppedge et al. (2015c), is one in which decision makers
are held responsible to citizens through fair elections in a society in which political and civic organizations
can operate freely.
6For more information on the construction of the electoral democracy index and other variables, refer to
the codebook.
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gas production, given by Haber and Menaldo (2011).7 To represent social pressures,
we added a logged estimate of the total population, in millions, and in alternative
specifications we included the average number of years of education among citizens older
than 15 (Coppedge et al. 2015). What is more, due to the possibility that internal
conflict dynamics di↵er by region, we denoted the geographic region in which each country
is located (Haber and Menaldo, 2011). Finally, to isolate other temporal e↵ects from
electoral consistency, we included a count of the number of years between each election
and the number of prior elections that had taken place, as well as an interaction of the
two variables.
Although the V-Dem dataset contains 19,549 country-year observations representing
173 countries, the sample is substantially reduced because it is necessarily restricted to
electoral regimes that held more than two elections. We lose some additional observations
by starting with the second election, along with some missing values associated with the
dependent variables. The starting sample is thus restricted to roughly 3,715 country-year
observations regarding executive elections, representing 75 countries and 109 years. For
legislative elections, the sample size is 8,178 observations, which represent 112 countries
and 111 years. Summary statistics are provided in the Appendix (Table 3).
4. Results
Table 1 shows the results of a logistic regression predicting internal armed conflict,
expressed as odds ratios. In the interpretation of the results, coe cients greater than one
indicate an increased likelihood of domestic conflict, while values less than one indicate a
decreased likelihood associated with each one-unit increase in the independent variable.
To mitigate further endogeneity concerns, we lagged all of the independent variables
by one year. Additionally, we included a count of the number of years since the last
conflict event, as well as its squared value, to account for the time dependent nature of
conflict likelihood (Beck and Tucker, 1998). In robustness tests, we also interpret the
7To apply a logarithmic transformation to the resource data and maintain observations with a zero, we
first added one to each observation.
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results against a lag of the dependent variable as a more conservative control for time
dependence.
Along with regions of the developing world, the coe cients associated with income
and population suggest that countries with higher levels of per capita GDP and larger
populations are at greater risk of internal armed conflict, the estimates for which are
significant above a 95-percent level of confidence. When we include squared values
of logged GDP per capita and population, both logged GDP and its square cease to
significantly predict internal unrest. Similarly, both logged population and its squared
values are not robustly associated with a decreased likelihood of internal armed conflict.
Accounting for democratic consolidation, in the form of higher values of an index of
electoral democracy, shows that there is a strong, negative relationship between level of
democracy and internal conflict. As might be expected, conflict risk exhibits a positive
quadratic relationship with the time since last conflict–it decreases as time passes, then
becomes more likely.
By itself, deviation from consistent executive elections is positively associated with
internal armed conflict below a five-percent probability of error. With the addition
of covariates beyond the time since the last conflict, however, the measure loses any
significance. What is more, deviation from the average interval between executive
elections does not appear to be strongly associated with internal armed conflict even
according to the simplest specifications. Whether measured in terms of immediate or
long-term change, therefore, the irregularity of executive elections does not appear to
exert a noteworthy influence on the likelihood of internal armed conflict.
Whereas the first two models in Table 1 suggest that changes in the timing of
executive elections may not matter for domestic instability, the latter two models point
to di↵erent conclusions concerning legislative elections. In the third model, the results
suggest that a change in the timing of legislative elections is associated with an increase
in the odds of conflict of about 0.455. Similarly, a one-unit deviation from the average
interval between legislative elections is associated with roughly a 25 percent increase in
the probability of internal armed conflict. The standard errors around this estimate are
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small enough to support rejecting the null hypothesis below a one-percent probability of
error. The estimates are robust to the inclusion of controls for natural resources and the
level of education as well.8 When the model is restricted to civil war (Table 4 in the
Appendix), a similar relationship exists but only the binary indicator of a di↵erence in
the intervals of legislative elections is statistically significant.
As a test of the second hypothesis, we specified the same set of models as Table 1
but included interaction terms between the electoral democracy index and the measures
of deviation from election intervals. The coe cients associated with the interaction
terms are shown in Table 2. In either the fully specified model or more simplified
specifications, there is little confidence in an interactive e↵ect between level of electoral
democracy and election inconsistency on internal armed conflict. Although the coe cient
is in the expected direction in models based on the binary indicator of changes in the
interval between elections, the standard errors around the estimate are much too large to
assign meaning to the relationship. Interestingly, estimating domestic conflict based on
the amount of deviation from the average intervals between executive elections and its
interaction with the electoral democracy index suggests that deviation is associated with
a decreased likelihood of conflict but that the relationship is negatively related to the
level of democracy. The relationship is highly sensitive to the exclusion of countries in
Latin America, from which we conclude that it is characterizing the e↵orts by incumbent
presidents in the region to extend their tenure.
In testing the relationship between electoral consistency and domestic stability, we
subjected the analyses to a number of robustness tests. A regular finding is that changes
in the consistency of executive elections do not matter for predicting domestic stability.
However, accounting for the number of elections that had occurred and the length of time
since the last election shows that a higher number of executive elections is significantly
associated with both internal armed conflict and civil war. The time since the last
8When we estimate both a linear and quadratic relationship between internal armed conflict and natural
resources the squared term is negatively associated with internal armed conflict below a five-percent
probability of error; on its own, however the logged value of total resources does not significantly predict
internal unrest. Additionally, a higher number of average years of education among citizens is significantly
associated with a decreased likelihood of internal armed conflict.
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executive election does not appear to matter, nor does an interaction term between the
two. As it pertains to legislative elections, the time since the last legislative elections
is positively associated with conflict risk, but not the number of elections. In a model
predicting civil
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Table 2. Coe cients associated with interaction term
executive elections legislative elections
di↵erent from last interval 1.384 1.607
(0.476) (0.352) ??
di↵erence from avg. interval 0.645 1.060
(0.125) ?? (0.261) ??
electoral democracy index 0.038 0.025 0.299 0.227
(0.027) ??? (0.157) ??? (0.121) ??? (0.149) ??
interaction term 0.766 2.148 0.794 1.525
(0.584) (0.867) ? (0.355) (0.509)
standard errors in parentheses;
p<0.01***, p<0.05**, p<0.10**
all independent variables lagged by one year
war, both the number of legislative elections that have occurred and the time since the
last legislative election positively and significantly predict conflict occurrence.
Despite the inclusion of the number of elections and the time since last election, the
estimate associated with changes in the intervals between legislative elections remains
significant below a one-percent probability of error. Moreover, changes in the intervals
between legislative elections—as measured by either a binary indicator representing any
change, or the amount of change—remains positively and significantly related to internal
armed conflict when we account for the date of independence, term limits, civil society
participation, years of democracy, ethnic fractionalization, and Polity score. The results
are also robust to country- and year-clustered standard errors. They are also largely
robust to the inclusion of country- and year-fixed e↵ects, although the estimate associated
with the amount of deviation from the average intervals between legislative elections
ceases to be statistically significant.
When we separate nondemocracies from democracies, and between types of
democracies, we see notable di↵erences. For comparison, Figure 6 shows the results
of a model that includes only the binary indicator of di↵erence in the intervals between
legislative elections and the lagged dependent variable. The coe cients are shown with
their associated 90-percent confidence intervals. The relationship that we identified
between the consistency of legislative elections and armed conflict seems to pertain
to nondemocracies. Within democracies, however, the relationship is also statistically
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significant in presidential democracies. In additional specifications, we estimated the
same set of independent variables on alternative dependent variables that are indicative of
di↵erent forms of political unrest. Interestingly, the results suggest that while inconsistent
legislative elections increase the likelihood of armed conflict in nondemocracies more than
in democracies, they make demonstrations, government crises, and coups more likely
in democracies but not in nondemocracies. The e↵ect di↵ers between parliamentary
and presidential democracies, however, and in all cases deviation from the prior interval
between legislative elections increases the likelihood of irregular leader exit.
5. Discussion
Despite scholars’ interest in the viability of elections in new democracies and the extent
to which the timing of elections may a↵ect the prospects for peaceful transitions, scholars
have primarily been concerned with the timing of the first election. We argue, however,
that the timing of elections may matter well beyond the first election. Insofar as elections
represent “institutionalized uncertainty,” subsequent elections may need to be consistent
in interval to alleviate opponents’ concern regarding the likelihood of an election in the
future (Alexander, 2002, Fearon, 2011, Lupu and Riedl, 2012, Przeworski, 1991, Schedler,
2013). Formal election schedules may help to add credibility to the guarantees worked
out as part of a transitional arrangement, but the first-hand observation that elections
regularly occur should provide greater certainty and promote political stability in tenuous
circumstances. To demonstrate whether this may be the case, we regressed the likelihood
of domestic instability on a measure
of the extent to which there were deviations in the timing of each subsequent election
varied from prior executive and legislative elections. In doing so, we provided a
more direct test regarding the manner in which elections contribute to ‘self-enforcing
democracy’ (Fearon, 2011).
The results of the empirical models provide several noteworthy conclusions regarding
the relationship between election regularity and democratic stability. First, we found
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Figure 6. Alternative specification tests
armed conflict
strikes, riots, &
anti−govt. protests
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government crises
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−.5 0 .5 1
estimate
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armed conflict
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government crises
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Figures show the coe cient associated with di↵erence in intervals between legislative
elections, with 90-percent confidence intervals
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that the regularity of executive elections—as measured by deviation from the last
election interval or from past intervals between elections—is not a dependable predictor
of either internal armed conflict or civil war. Despite assessing the predictive ability of
the measure in a variety of model specifications, the inconsistency of executive elections
is not significantly related to the likelihood of domestic unrest. At present, the only
stylized facts that we can report about executive elections is that a greater number of
executive elections is associated with a higher risk of either internal armed conflict or civil
war, and that the regularity of executive elections seems most important in presidential
democracies. Specifically, the empirical relationship between regular intervals of executive
elections and government crises and coups in presidential democracies contributes to
extant work regarding the fragility of presidential democracy (Cheibub, 2006, Linz,
1990).
Second, in contrast to the finding that consistency in the intervals between executive
elections does not statistically predict domestic instability, we found that the regularity
of legislative elections is a robust predictor of both internal armed conflict and civil war.
Deviation from the average number of years between legislative elections is positively
associated with domestic conflict at both levels, and the relationship holds to a number of
specification tests. In particular, the relationship remains a robust predictor of domestic
instability several years prior to the event, thereby helping to alleviate concerns about
the possible endogeneity of instability and the timing of elections. As it regards the first
hypothesis, therefore, we found support for the expectation that electoral inconsistency is
associated with an increased risk of domestic instability, but only for legislative elections.
Figure 7 shows the predicted values estimated from the models shown in Table 1. While
deviations from the average interval between executive elections do not strongly e↵ect
the likelihood of either internal conflict or civil war, the impact is more pronounced for
legislative elections.
The finding that the regularity of legislative elections matters, most prominently
in nondemocratic regimes but also in presidential democracies, is consistent with the
theory and with the broader literature on power sharing. It provides empirical support
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for the notion that the regularity of legislative elections provides a source of credible
commitment to actors who may otherwise oppose the leader (Svolik, 2009). In contrast
to the executive o ce, the legislature provides seats that can be used to co-opt and
mollify opponents of the
Figure 7. Predicted probabilities of internal armed conflict associated with
election irregularity
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regime (Gandhi, 2008, Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007). In the negotiation of power sharing
between the executive and his or her ruling coalition, therefore, consistent intervals in the
elections by which legislative seats are distributed may be an important indicator of the
executive’s commitment to working with opponents. Their inconsistency may also deprive
coalition members the expectation that there will be future opportunities to update their
beliefs about the executive, making present action against the regime more likely (Svolik,
2009). To this end, the finding points to the value of better understanding how the
timing of legislative elections impacts the willingness of outside actors to participate
in the electoral process (Lemarchand, 2007, Lustick, 1979). An important qualifier for
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gauging the e↵ectiveness of consociational democracy may be to consider how consistent
the intervals between elections have been.
A noteworthy qualification is that while there appears to be a relationship between
election intervals and armed conflict in nondemocracies and presidential democracies, this
is not true of parliamentary democracies. In contrast, the consistency of intervals between
executive or legislative elections increases the likelihood of government crises and coups in
democracies, and irregular legislative elections increase the likelihood of demonstrations.
Our interpretation for why there is a di↵erence between forms of political instability with
regard to election regularity in democracies and nondemocracies concerns the executive’s
control over peripheral state institutions. To the extent that the executive is able to
exert control over public demonstrations, labor unions, her cabinet, and the armed forces,
armed conflict should be the more likely recourse.
Third, we found no support for the second hypothesis, which was that changes
in the timing of elections are likely to unleash destabilizing forces in less democratic
countries. In alternative specification tests, we interacted deviations from past elections
with the years of democracy, the level of civil society participation, and the Polity
score. All the same, we only found statistical significance to support the second
hypothesis in a model that interacted the dummy variable for di↵erences in the intervals
between legislative elections and Polity. Though it may be theoretically intuitive that
deviations from consistent elections should matter more for newer and less-consolidated
democracies, this expectation found little empirical support despite operationalizing
democratic consolidation in di↵erent ways.
The results of the analysis thus highlight the importance of focusing not just on
when first elections should be implemented in post-conflict societies and in countries
transitioning to democracy, but also on the maintenance of a regular pattern of elections
during the process of institutionalizing uncertainty among actors. A valuable next step
is for additional research on the topic to further elucidate on the extent to which this
matters, and in which contexts. An important future extension of this research question is
to apply it to subnational elections. In part, this may require more qualitative depictions
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of the electoral process, or a reappraisal of existing case studies. The dataset that we
drew on to answer this question is one of the largest and most complete projects to date,
but the sample size was constrained by the need to restrict the analysis to countries that
had had more than two elections, after the second election. To better discern the role of
election timing in promoting domestic stability, a more nuanced empirical model may also
be needed, though estimating a more sophisticated model such as a multi-stage regression
further limits the number of observations that would be available. Nevertheless, we found
strong support for the theoretical argument that warrants further investigation.
The finding that there is a relationship between election regularity and democratic
stability has implications for election advisers in the developing world, insofar as it
encourages a renewed focus on ongoing election activity. In particular, it emphasizes the
importance of planning of subsequent elections to be consistent with actors’ expectations.
As we showed, despite the conventional definition of democratic elections as being
regular in their occurrence, many elections in democracies do not occur in consistent
intervals. In this regard, the United States is a notable exception to many other
established democracies. Moreover, the importance of considering separately the impacts
of the time to elections and those of the time between elections hearkens to existing
conversations about the nature of time dependence. Several political scientists have
called for researchers to theoretically unpack di↵erent forms of time dependence to
better understand how causal processes unfold (Grzymala-Busse, 2011, Pierson, 2004).
This constitutes several avenues for future research on the stability-promoting e↵ect of
elections.
6. Conclusion
This study contributes to existing discussions on the relative importance of election
timing by focusing on a di↵erent aspect than has previously been empirically examined.
While many scholars have been interested in the relevance of the timing of first elections
in post-conflict societies and in the initial stages of democratization, we argue that
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the regularity of subsequent elections are also important. Using a binary indicator of
consistency in the intervals between elections and a measure of the deviation of elections
from the average interval between past elections, we found that the regularity of executive
elections does not have much of an impact on domestic stability. In contrast, we found
that inconsistent legislative elections are positively associated with internal armed conflict
and civil war. The relationship exhibits considerable robustness, encouraging future
research to consider the importance of holding legislative elections at consistent intervals
to promote the institutionalization of uncertainty.
In spite of some existing limitations that hamper the ability to more fully explore the
dynamic between the tempo of elections and political stability—namely, the presence of
a formal schedule and data on subnational elections—we found evidence that encourages
scholars to think beyond the timing of the first election and to more seriously consider the
process of implementing elections in developing democracies. Our theoretical argument
helps to explain why consistent elections may matter for shaping actors’ incentives to
participate in an uncertain electoral climate. What is more, it meshes well with research
on the strategic use of elections in nondemocracies and dynamics involving the ruling
coalition in authoritarian (and semi-authoritarian) regimes. This supports future research
on the topic of election regularity and political stability that can yield insights for both
academic and policy considerations.
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Appendix
Figure 8. Tabulation of changes in election intervals associated with conflict
observations
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Table 3. Summary statistics
variable N mean std. dev. min. max.
internal armed conflict 12706 0.097 0.295 0 1
civil war 10149 0.065 0.247 0 1
di↵erent from last interval, executive 4686 0.404 0.491 0 1
ln(di↵erence) from avg. interval, executive 3745 0.215 0.756 -2.708 3.172
di↵erent from last interval, legislative 10963 0.554 0.497 0 1
ln(di↵erence) from avg. interval, legislative 9081 0.289 0.807 -3.219 4.199
E.Europe 10303 0.114 0.318 0 1
L.America 10303 0.197 0.398 0 1
M.East/N.Africa 10303 0.097 0.296 0 1
S.S.Africa 10303 0.198 0.399 0 1
W.Europe/N.America 10303 0.214 0.410 0 1
E.Asia 10303 0.038 0.191 0 1
S.E.Asia 10303 0.050 0.218 0 1
S.Asia 10303 0.051 0.220 0 1
Pacific 10303 0.010 0.097 0 1
Caribbean 10303 0.030 0.172 0 1
ln(GDPpc) 10403 7.813 1.025 5.315 10.667
ln(population) 17545 15.159 1.852 7.224 21.009
executive electoral regime 16168 0.284 0.451 0 1
legislative electoral regime 16168 0.634 0.482 0 1
ln(resources) 10239 3.170 2.478 0 11.304
education, 15+ 14377 4.496 3.274 0.004 17.646
time since last election, executive 5355 5.082 7.236 1 80
time since last election, legislative 11548 3.781 4.909 1 84
electoral democracy index 15657 0.333 0.281 0.008 0.961
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Figure 9. Alternative specification tests
armed conflict
strikes, riots, &
anti−govt. protests
government crises
military coups
irregular leader exit
−1 −.5 0 .5 1
estimate
non−democracies only
armed conflict
strikes, riots, &
anti−govt. protests
government crises
military coups
irregular leader exit
−1 −.5 0 .5 1
estimate
democracies only
armed conflict
strikes, riots, &
anti−govt. protests
government crises
military coups
irregular leader exit
−1 −.5 0 .5 1
estimate
parliamentary only
armed conflict
strikes, riots, &
anti−govt. protests
government crises
military coups
irregular leader exit
−1 −.5 0 .5 1
estimate
presidential only
Figures show the coe cient associated with di↵erence in intervals between executive
elections, with 90-percent confidence intervals
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